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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
FRED MATTER!,
Defendant and Appellant.

I
(

Case No.
7413

)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant was tried before a jury in the Third District
Court on a charge of murder. From a verdict and judgment of
guilty of murder in the first degree, and sentence thereon, he has
appealed.
Plaintiff agrees, generally, with the statement of facts as
incorporated in the brief of appellant. But inasmuch as the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict has been questioned, and such sufficiency has thus become a point of law, it

3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

will be necessary to include in the argument a portion of the
evidence produced by the state.
POINTS
1. The evidence was sufficient to support a verdict of

guilty of murder in the first degree.
2. In instructing the jury concerning the degrees of mur-

der, and reasonable doubt as to degree, the court was not required to use the exact language of 105-32-5 Utah Code Annotated
1943.
3. It is not prejudicial error for a court to inform the jury
of the steps the court may take in deciding whether to follow a
mercy recommendation.
4. There is nothing in the record to show that the court
abused its discretion in refusing to follow the mercy recommendation of the jury.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A
VERDICT OF GUILTY OF MURDER IN THE FIRST
DEGREE.
There is no quarrel with defendant's cited cases insofar as
they are used to indicate the elements of .first and second degree murder. Nor can we take issue with the statement that first
degree murder requires a showing-except in specified instances
4
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--that the defendant killed the deceased with malice aforethought, deliberation and premeditation. State v.' Russell, 106
Utah 116, 145 P. 2d 1003; State v. Trujillo (Utah) No. 7269.
_- _Murder is defined, and its. elements set out, by statute in
Utah. The statutory provisions are found in 103-28-1, 2 and
3 Utah Code Annotated 1943:
"Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being
with malice aforethought.'' ( 103-28-1) .
"Such malice may be express or implied. It is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention
unlawfully to take the life of a fellow creature. It is
implied when no considerable provocation appears, or
when the circumstances attending the killing show an
abandoned and malignant heart." (103-28-2)
"Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait
or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious and
premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration
of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, burglary
or robbery; or perpetrated from a premeditated design
unlawfully to effect the death of any human heing other
than the one who is killed; or perpetrated by any act
greatly dangerous to the lives of others and evidencing
a depraved mind, regardless of human life;-is murder
in the first degree. Any other homicide committed
under such circumstances as would have constituted
murder at common law is murder in the second degree."
( 103-28-3)
These sections have ,been analyzed by this .court in the
two cases cited above (State v. Russell, 106 Utah 116, 145 P.
2d 1003; State v. Trujillo (Utah) No. 7269]
In the court below the case was submitted to the· jury

on
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the theory that the evidence might show a "willful, deliberate,
malicious and premeditated killing" only. There was no instruction concerning poison, or killing while committing one of the
designated felonies. There is no pretense that the defendant was
attempting to kill any person other than Delk, or that he was
behaving in a depraved manner toward a group of persons.
As far as the sufficiency of the evidence is concerned, then, the
question is resolved into one of whether there is enough evidence to support a verdict that the defendant willfully, deliberately, maliciously and premedit~tedly killed Levi P. Delk. The
defense contends that the evidence indicates "no acts of preparation, no securing of weapons, no lying in wait," "no bo~.sts,
no threats, no arguments, nor other difficulties between the
accused and Delk."
It is admitted that if any of the elements above listed had

appeared the state's case would have been strengthened. But
that argument goes to what evidence might have been used,
if available, to convict the defendant. Our problem is concerned with the sufficiency of the evidence actually presented.
The record of the proceedings discloses the following evidence and testimony of facts and circumstances upon which the
jury could rely in reaching its verdict:
When the deceased was found, he had been brutally beaten. There were several injuries on the body, the most severe of
which was located on the left side of the rear part of the head.
At that point there was an "irregular laceration of the scalp
from the top of the head down below the left ear"-about 7

6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3tU

::)J
:

~~

.,, ...

..... 1

:;:n

inches in length. The posterior part of the left side of the skull
was broken in several places. On the front of the skull there was
a laceration three quarters of an inch long which extended
inward to the bone. The throat was punctured, apparently with
a sharp instrument and after the death of deceased. Abra:iiCJns
and contusions were found on various parts of the bo·dy. On
the right side of the forehead there was a bruise of two inches
diameter. Also on the forehead were three abrasions, "two
which measured one inch in diameter each and a third which
was one and a half inches long and about one-eigh~h inch in
width." There was another abrasion on the nose. On the right
knee there was one large abrasion and eight linear abrasions
which were one-half to one inch long. An abrasion was found
on the anterior part of the left leg, surrounded by an area of
hemorrhage in the tissues. (R. 86-89) .
An expert testified that the death of Delk resulted from
the injury on the back of the head, that is, the seven-inch laceration and skull fracture (R. 90). This was caused by a blow with
a "blunt object, possibly with a sharp or jagged edge." The
blow must have been struck with great force (R. 90), and the
injury was such that it would have necessarily been fatal (R.
91). The force of the blow was so great that it could not have
resulted from a fall to the ground after a blow to the chin. To
cause such an injury by falling, the fall would have to· h::~ve
been from a great height (R. 97, 98). It was improbable that
a blunt instrument made the laceration on the forehead

(R. 98).
The body of deceased was found by two small boys on
7
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May 6 while they were playing along Little Cottonwood
creek (R. 110). The body was in the creek, and about half under
water (R. ·115), but death did not result from drowning

(R. 90).
From the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing,
the nature and number of the wounds, the location of the body
outside of any populous area, and the apparent placing of the
body in a creek, the jury might at this point fairly conclude that
the death of Delk was caused by a criminal agency, and that the
agency responsible (whoever it was) had premiditatedly, maliciously, and deliberately perpetrated the killing. It is not contended that there was anything in the record to show or
tend to show mitigation, provocation, or justification for the
killing.

·~:

~d

In addition to the facts and circumstances which immediately surrounded the killing, there is additional evidence
which points toward premeditation and toward the defendant.

:,)·

2:1

.:~

It could be concluded that the defendant was either acquainted with Delk, or that he was familiar with his habits. The
two lived at the. same tourist court and trailer camp at 3115
Siluth State Street in Salt Lake County (R. 136, 137, 138). The
deceased was regular in his habits, usually leaving the court
about 9 or 10 in the morning and returning about 5 or 6 p.m.
(R . 139 ) .

:1.]

~t]

:::t[

:lt

:lr]
't~rt

Next to the apartment of defendant was an unfinished
8
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.. apartment. After the discovery _of Delk' s. bndy investigators
found on the floor of this vacant unit indications of blood and
vomit ( R. 260). The deceased· s blood was type "A" in the
International Blood Grouping system (R. 317). On the floor
of the unfinished apartment were found a paint stick and some
paper stained with blood of type "A" (R. 320~ 321). There
was evidence of blood on the floor, but it was· present in such
small quantities that it did not admit of typing. An expert
testified that vomiting often accompanies a fracture of the
skull (R. 358, 359).
From the automobile of Levi P. Delk the-state took some
pieces of rubber matting (R. 340) which appeared to be stained
with blood. These stains "tested positive" for the possible presence of blood (R. 319). On the panel of the left door of the
truck were similar stains, which also "tested positive" (R. 341,
267, 323). The truck had been washed on the inside prior to
the time it was examined by investigating officers (R. 267).
It was brought out that the key possessed by defendant

for his apartment fitted, also, the unfinished unit, next to his,
in which the stains were found (R. 142) .
The tourist court operators last saw deceased alive on the
evening of April 29 (R. 140). On the morning of April 30,
defendant, in the presence of a notary public, signed the name
of Levi P. Delk to a title certificate of Delk' s truck and stated
that he was Delk (R. 167). Later the same day the defendant
represented himself to be Delk and sold the Willys panel truck
to a dealer (R. 207-212). Defendant was unsuccessful in his
9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

attempt to sell a watch which had belonged to deceased (R.
23 7), so he then pawned the watch in his own name (R. 246).
When his landlady visited him on the morning of May 3, defendant was upset (R. 183).
The record contains evidence that while defendant was
awating trial he began preparations for an escape from the
Salt Lake County jail in which he was confined (R. 345-358).
The above is a summary of the bulk of the state's evidence
on which conviction was based. The record does, however,
disclose certain other facts and circumstances which might have
been considered by the jury. We rely upon the following cases
and propositions of law to show that the jury was justified in
finding that defendant coldly, premeditatedly, maliciously, and
deliberately, murdered Levi P. Delk.
The defense has argued at some length on the difference
between express and implied malice, and the degree of murder
which must be found where one or the other is shown. And
while we feel that our statute sufficiently defines the elements
of each degree so that these common law distinctions are superseded, we would like to point out that express malice was
shown in this case.
The difference between express malice and implied malice
is of necessity a difference in the degree of malice shown, and
not a diffrence in the type of evidence upon which the proof
is based. In 1 Wharton's Criminal Law (11th Ed.), Sec. 145,
we find the following statement:
"The older English text-books distinguish between
'malice express' and 'malice implied.' This, however, as
10
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is elsewhere shown, cannot be sustained. Our only way
of proving malice is by inferring it from circumstance$.
Even should a party, when examined on the stand, say,
'I did the act maliciously,' the question would still remain, how far the statement is to be believed. The mode
of proof is not demonstration, but inference."

Our statute in effect adopts this view. Express malice is
that malice in which there is manifested a deliberate intention
unlawfully to take the life of a fellow creature. But, still under
the statute, the lew· will imply malice where there is shown an
unlawful killing and no considerable provocation appears; or
where the circumstances surrounding the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. There is nothing in the statute to
indicate that express malice must be manifested by words or
statements, or acts of preparation.
We feel that this should answer the technical nicety of
distinction between types of malice. \Vith this gone, the attack on the sufficiency of the evidence must be based upon the
idea that there was simply not that quantum of evidence which
is necessary to sustain the verdict. It is well settled that a conviction for first degree murder can be had on circumstantial
evidence alone.
People v. Howard, 211 Cal. 322, 295 Pac. 333, 71 A. L. R.
1385, supports the contention of the defendant that where
ma~ice is "implied" it is second degree murder. But an examination of the cases cited in the Howard opinion shows that
express malice may be inferred. One of the cases cited therein
is People v. Bellon, 180 Cal. 706, 182 Pac. 420. It is used to
support the statement that "if the act is preceded by, and be

u
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the result of, a concurrence of will, deliberation and intent,
the crime of first degree murder is proved."
In People v. Bellon· the defendant had pleaded guilty to
a charge of murder. California law required the court to determine the degree. It was shown that the defendant had committed a violent assault upon his wife; and when the deceased,
his mother-in-law, attempted to interfere, defendant slashed
her throat with a razor. The California Supreme Court, in
answer to the contention that the elements of first degree murder were not shown, said:
"It is difficult to attribute any other design than that
of killing to one who knowingly strikes at the throat of
another with a sharp razor with such force and strength
as to cause death."

Another California case concerned with the sufficiency
of circumstantial evidence is People v. Peete, 54 Cal. App. 333,
202 Pac. 51 (hearing denied by Supreme Court November
25, 1921). There the body of deceased was discovered some four
months after the killing. Defendant had been a tenant in a
house owned by deceased, and in which the body was found. A
physician testified that the deceased was probably killed by
a bullet wound, though it was possible that death was caused
by strangulation. Defendant was a small woman and deceased
a 200-pound man. After discovery of the body it was learned
that defendant had sold some jewelry of the deceased. After the
defendant had sublet the house to another, a pistol was found
in one of the closets. Defendant had made some inconsistent
statements to police officers. There was no direct evidence of
12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

::]

1~1
~] 1

malice, p,reme<litation, or deliberation. Yet the California Court
of Appeal (and the Supreme Court) upheld a conviction of
murder in the first degree. Said the Court of Appeal:
;,It i~ the general, if not universal, rule tha.t. where,
here, the evidence is entirely circumstantial, and no
claim of any mitigating circumstances, justification, or
excuse for the killing is advanced by the accused, the
jury, from the nature of the wound inflicted, from the
character of the weapon which the nature of the wound
indicates was used, from the acts and conduct of the
accused, and all the attendant and surrounding facts may
infer that the deceased was unlawfully killed by the
accused, with malice aforethought, as a result of a deliberate and premeditated purpose to kill, and so inferring, the jury under such circumstances, may be warranted in returning a verdict of murder in the first degree. If a different rule prevailed, then, as· was said in
People v. Mahatch, 148 Cal. 203, 82 Pac. 779, 'secret
murders could rarely be punished by the infliction of
the highest penalty.' * * *
a~

~

See State v. Dickson, 78 Mo. 447. The question
of the degree of the crime is exclusively for the JUry,
and their determination will not be disturbed when
there is any evidence to support it. People v. Machuca,
158 Cal. 64, 109 Pac. 886. We think that the circumstances disclosed by the evidence are ample to support
the inference that the killing was unlawful, was done
with malice aforethought. and was willful, deliberate
and premeditated. * * *"
People v. Mahatch, 148 Cal. 203, 82 Pac. 779, cited in the
opinion, supra, was another case of an unwitnessed killing.
The killer and the killed had apparently been friends priorto
the homicide. In upholding the first degree murder verdict, the
California Supreme Court said:
13
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, :, "The jury, having found that the only extenuating
circurnstan.ces which he interposed had no existence in
fact, and no ,claim of .any cin;um.stances .of mitigation,
. justificatioQ o.t; excuse for the . killing being advanced,
had a right to .infer from the character of the weapon
used, the nature of the wound inflict~, and the acts
and conduct of the accused, the existence of a deliberate. purpo,se on his .p~tt to kill. the, deceased when the
fatal blow was struck, and, so inferring, were warranted in returning a verdi<::t. therefrom for murder in the
first degree. This is the general, it may be said the
univer~al, rule. * * *"
In People v.. Davis, 8 Utah 412, 32 Pac. 670, the Utah
Supreme Court held sufficient a pleading which omitted the
allegation that there was an intent to kill. It was said there
that the intent could be inferred from the facts pleaded, and
that it was difficult to comprehend, from the instrument used,
the fierceness of the assault, the manner and place of inflicting
the wourids, and the instantly fatal result, that the defendant
intended to commit any crime except first degree murder.

In People v. Halliday, 5 Utah 467, 17 Pac. 118, the court
was called upon to consider the elements of murder in the first
degree. The opinion adopted the language of the Pennsylvania
case of Keenan v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. St. 55, as follows:
"What the definition [of malice] requires, therefore, is a distinctly formed intent to kill, not ·in self
defense, and without adequate provocation. It requires
the malice prepense or aforethought of the common
·.law· definition of murder to be, not a general malice,
· but a special maliCe that aims at the life of a person.
·This distinctly formed intent to take life is easily distinguished, in the general from the instinctiveand spon14
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-tanoeus reaction of mind and body against insult and
injury, which is often the result of no distinctly formed
intention; and also from those cases of previous and
deliberate intention to kill, which may override even
what without it· would be adquate provocation given
at the time of the killing.
Keeping this common understanding of the definition in mind, we shall also get clear of the influence
of the cases in other states, where the terms deliberate
and premeditated are applied to the malice or intent, and
not to the act, and thus seem to require a purpose
brooded over, and matured before the occasion at which
it is carried into act. Under such a definition of the intention, all our jurisprudence by v.rhich malice and intent a !"e
implied from the character of the act, and from the deadly nature of the weapon used, would be set aside; for
we could not from these imply such a previous and deliberate but only a distinctly formed intent, and this
involves deliberation and premeditation,· though they
may be very brief. We should therefore blot out all 9ur
law relative to implied intent or malice, and .require it
to be always proved as express. And this would be a
most disastrous result; for the most deliberate murderers are usually those who know how to conceal their
intent until the occasion arises for the execution of it."
The Supreme Court of Oregon has held that circumstantia]
evidence is sufficient to establish all of the elements of murder
in the first degree. In State v. Butcheck, ·121 Or. 141, 254 Pac.
805, denymg a rehearing of 121, Or~ 141, ,253 Pac. 367, that
court said:
"The indict!llent in this. case alleges a specific pur. pose to kill. However, in.order to constitute murder in
the first degree, the.re must be deliberation and premedi. taJ~on. But like:. every other material fact. arising on the

15
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trial, the formed design to kill may be est~blished by
, circumstantial evidence which satisfies the mmds of the
jurors, . beyond a. reasonable doubt, of the existen~e of
a previous purpose to kill. Here the law wisely calls
to its aid, in the administration of justice, ·presumptive
evidence. The trial begins with the· pres1,1mption _of the
defenda(lt's innocence. But, upon the proof of the
commission of an unlawful act, the presumption is that
such act 'was done with an unlawful intent' and that
the perpetrator intends the unlawful consequence of
his voluntary act.' Or. L. Sec. 799, subds. 1, 2, 3, * * *
The existence of deliberate and premeditated malice in the killer's mind is the result of a mental condition and is not subject to direct proof. For this reason its existence may be inferred from tangible facts
in evidence. 2 Bishops Criminal Law, p. 511; Underhill on Criminal Evidence (3rd Ed.) p. 709. As supporting this doctrine, see Wharton on Homicide, Sec. 150,
2 Bishop's Crim. Law, Sec. 673, Cyclopedia of Criminal
Law, Brill, 1076, and 30 C. J. 142, 143, where it is held
that deliberation and premeditation may be inferred, as
a matter of fact, from the circumstances, act, conduct,
language, the character of the weapon used, and the
nature and number of wounds inflicted.''
· The doctrines announced in the above cases have received wide support. See People v. Erno, 195 Cal. 272, 232
Pac. 710; State v. Hansen, 25 Or. 391, 35 Pac. 976; Hughes
v. State, 29 Tex. Cr. App. 565, 16 S. W. 548; 3 Warren on
Homicide 401.
Tlie evidence also tended to show ( 1) Delk was taken
to a remote spot and there killed, or ( 2) Delk was killed in the
vacant unit adjacent. to defendant's apartment, and then the
body was taken to a remote spot. Concealment of a body is a
circumstanc~ which may be considered in determining the guilt
16
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or innocence of an accused. See Hedger v. State ( 1911), 144
Wis. 279, 128 N. W. 80, where the accused had been in and
about the house in which his wife's body was later found. His
failure to give an alarm, or disclose the fact of death, was held
to be a circumstance justifying an inference of guilt. See, also,
a note in 2 A. L. R. 1227. The jury might conclude that whoever killed Delk did it with malice aforethought and premeditation and then concealed the body, or that the killer thought
out the act and premeditatedly took Delk to a remote spot and
killed him there.
The evidence that defendant was in possession of deceased's truck and watch serves a purpose at least twofold
in nature. It ties the defendant to the crime, and it gives some
added information as to the probability of premeditation.
In 2 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 276, we find the following
statement:
"Whenever goods have been taken as a part of the
criminal act, the fact of subsequent possession is some
indication that the possessor was the taker, and therefore the doer of the whole crime. Thus such possession
is receivable to prove other acts than the simple crime of
larceny. It is receivable to show the commission of a
burglary, a counterfeiting, a murder, a liquor .relltng,
or any other crime in which either a chief or a subordinate result might be the possession of a material article." (Author's emphasis) .
In Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613, 40 L. Ed. 1090,
16 S. Ct. 895, decided before there was any difference in degrees of murder, deceased was found in a decomposed condi17
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tion ·about two weeks after he was last seen alive. Defendant
was arrested on the same day the body was discovered. In his
possess~on were five horses, a ~olt, wagon, gun, and bedclothing
and other property which had belonged .to the dead man. The
defendant was convicted of murder. The United States Supreme Court said:
"Possession of the fruits of a crime recently after
its commission justifies the inference that the possession
is guilty possession, and, though only prima facie evidence of guilt, may be of controlling weight unless explained by circumstances or accounted for in some way
consistent with innocence. 1 Greenl. Ev. (15th Ed.)
Sec. 34. * * * Proof that defendant had in his possession, .soon after, articles apparently taken from the deceased at the time of his death is always admissible,
and the fact, with its legitimate inference, is to be considered by the jury with the other facts in the case in
arriving at their verdict.''
And see 4 Warren on Homicide 173:
"Where money or other property of the deceased
was found in the possession of the defendant it is evidence of premeditated and deliberate killing."
The Oregon case of State v. Barnes, 47 Or. 592, 85 Pac.
998, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 181, contains a good discussion of the
significance of possession of stolen property. See opinion and
cases cited atpp. 1001 and 1002 of the Pacific Reporter; Little
v. S~q~e, 39 Tex. Cr. App. 654, 47 S. W. 984.
A~ :ras pointe.d out, supra, the evidence below also tended
tp prove ~hat. defendant, while in the county jail, prepared to
make an escape. See 2 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 276:
18
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"It is today universally recognized that the fact of
an accused's flight, escape from custody, resistance to
arrest, concealment, assumption of a false name, and
related conduct, are admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt, and thus of guilt itself."
And see the numerous cases cited and discussed in that section.
The following authorities may also be found helpful: State
v. Barnes, cited supra, 47 Or. 592, 85 Pac. 998, 7 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 181; State v. Morgan, 22 Utah 162, 61 Pac. 527; People
v. Flannelly, 128 Cal. 83, 60 Pac. 670.
From the record, and the authorities cited and quoted,
we see that the jury was justified in concluding that defendant
had murd~red deceased in cold blood, with malice aforethought,
premeditation and deliberation. The evidence was such that
the jury could fairly find that defendant wanted property in
the possession of Delk, that he thereupon decided to kill Delk,
killed him in pursuance of his plan, and took his property.
We have confined the above discussion to first degree
murder. If the authorities cited are correct, a fortiori second
degree murder may be proved by circumstantial evidence. The
only difference would be that the circumstances would not have
to establish deliberation and premeditation.
POINT II
IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY CONCERNING THE ·
DEGREES OF MURDER, AND REASONABLE DOUBT AS
TO DEGREE, THE COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO
USE THE EXACT LANGUAGE OF 105-32-5 UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1943.
19
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'In instructing the jury as to what it should do in the event
there was reasonable doubt as to the degree of murder of which
defendant was guilty, the court said:
"You are further instructed that if you believe from
all of the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed either the offense specifically
charged in the information or one of the included offenses, but if you have a reasonable doubt as to which
of two or more offenses he did commit, then you can
convict him only of the lowest degree as to those between or among which lies your doubt." (R. 36).
Defendant had requested this instruction:

"If you find from the evidence that the Defendant
has committed a public offense and there is reasonable
ground of doubt in which of two or more degrees he
is guilty, under the law of this state you must find him
guilty of the lowest of such degrees only." (R. 31).
It is defendant's contention that the court's use of the
word "can" instead of the word "must" was prejudicial error
against the rights of defendant. An instruction similar to the
one in question now was given by the trial court in State v.
Cerar, 60 Utah 208, 207 Pac. 507. Said the court:
"It is somewhat vigorously contended that the court
erred in using the word 'can' instead of the term 'must',
, which latter term is used in the statute. A mere cursory
readi!lg of the instruction excepted to will disclose that,
if the district court had used the term 'must' counsel
in altlh;prdp~abilfifty wdo~ld bde hher~ complaf~md·nghthat th e
cour a m e ect 1recte t e Jury to m t e appe-1
lant guilty of some degree, and in such event there would
20
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at least be some reason for the contention. By using
the term 'must' in the instruction referred to a very
awkward expression would have resulted which might
have been construed to mean that the jury was required
to find the appellant guilty of some lower degree. The
instruction as it stands, in our judgment, clearly reflects
the true intent and purpose of the statute, and any juror
with sufficient intelligence to sit in any case would not
have been misled by what the court said."
The instruction requested by the defendant here might
have been construed by the jury as mandatory that they return
a verdict of guilty of some degree of murder, for manslaughter
is a public offense but is not, strictly, a degree of murder. We
will concede, however, that the insertion of "must" in the instruction actually given by the court would not have been objectionable. But the essence of the statute is that the jury is
required to find the lower degree, as between the higher and the
lower, when there is reasonable doubt as to degree. The instruction as given modifies the word "can" with the word "only." The
instruction as a whole leaves the jury no alternative but to
choose the lower grade offense in case of doubt. When "can"
is thus modified with "only" it can only be read as synonymous
with "must."

POINT III
IT IS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR A COURT TO
INFORM THE JURY OF THE STEPS THE COURT MAY
TAKE IN DECIDING WHETHER TO FOLLOW A MERCY
RECOMMENDATION.
21
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Another objection taken to the court's instructions is that
the defendant was prejudiced when the jury was given an explanation of the effect of a recommendation of mercy. This
supplemental instruction was given after the court had recalled the jury to learn of its progress. The foreman asked for
additional information. This request, and the court's answer,
will be found on page 392 of the record and page 27 of the
appellaht's brief.
The defendant contends that this statement by the court
was of such a nature that the jury could have been influenced
to bring in a verdict of first degree murder, with a recommendation of mercy, rather than a second degree verdict which they
would likely have returned in the absence of the court's statement.
We have been unable to find any authority which is directly in point with the question raised. State v. Kiefer, 16 S.D. 180,
91 N .W. 1117, 1 Ann. Cas. 268, 12 Am. Crim. Rep. 619, was
concerned with an instruction wherein the judge intimated to
the jury that he would follow a recommendation of mercy, and
in that case there was prejudicial error.
The problem here is somewhat different. The court did
not give the jury any indication of what it would do with a
recommendation of mercy but did, in fact, go to great lengths
to avoid answering the jury's question as to how the court
would "look at it." All the jury learned was the procedure the
court was allowed to follow under the law.
22
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As provided by 105-33-3, a court may instruct the jury
on a point of law after it has retired for deliberation, "if they
desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause,"
so long as this instruction is given in the presence of the defendant or his counsel.
It is our belief that the court, in giving the challenged
instruction, did nothing more than tell the jury, in the language
of the layman, the legal effect of a recommendation of mercy,
and the steps a court was allowed to take in determining the
punishment. The law is contained in the statutes. 105-36-12
Utah Code Annotated 1943 provides:
"When discretion is conferred upon the court as
to the extent of punishment, the court, at the time of
pronouncing judgment, may take into consideration any
circumstances, either in aggravation or mitigation of the
punishment, which may then be presented to it by either
party."
And 105-36-13:
"The circumtsances must be presented by the testimony of witnesses examined in open court, except that
when a witness is so ill or infirm as to be unable to
attend, his deposition may be taken by a magistrate of
the county, out of court, upon such notice to the adverse party as the court may direct. No affidavit or
testimony, or representation of any kind, verbal or
written, shall be offered to or received by the court or
a judge thereof in aggravation or mitigation of the
punishment, except as provided in this section."
These sections do not confine to "legal evidence" the
testimony which may be received in mitigation or aggravation.
23
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Our jurisprudence does not require that a jury be kept
ignorant of the law and the possible consequences of· a particular verdict. · The main requirement in cases of this type
is that the court do nothing which will mislead the jury to
the prejudice of the defendant. Here neither has the jury been
misled nor the defendant prejudiced. We cannot see how
12 jurors could have taken the above statement of the court
and used it as basis for returning a recommendation of mercy
in lieu of a verdict of murder in the second degree. There
was not a hint that the recommendation would be followed.
When the court had finished explaining, the jury had no foundation on which to conclude that defendant would not be
executed for first degree murder.

·~·

;Jf

a

There is no use speculating on what the jury might have
done without the explanation. The record indicates that the
jurors were concerned with what effect the recommendation
would have. It appears that they had reached a verdict if
the recommendation of mercy meant what they thought it
meant. After the explanation, the following conversation
took place:
"MR. CHRISTENSEN: I believe that is what we had
a question on. I believe we can bring back a verdict.

n

]}

l)l

THE COURT: And would you rather do that now
before· you disband?
M_R. CHRISTENSEN: Well, we can do it right here
now."
Further questioning indicated that the jury was not guite
24
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ready. They returned to the jury room at 10:31 p.m. and
returned with a verdict of guilty with recommendation of
mercy 11 minutes later (R. 392). A reading of the col1oquy
indicates to us that the jury could not decide whether or not
defendant should die. Having found that they could let the
court decide, they recommended mercy.
For the above reasons, we submit that the instruction
complained of was proper and that, even if there was a technical error, there is no basis for assuming that the defendant
was prejudiced thereby. The court is not justified in presuming that error has resulted in prejudice. 105-43-1 Utah
Code Annotated 1943.

POINT IV
THERE IS NOTHING IN THE RECORD TO SHOW
THAT THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO FOLLOW THE MERCY RECOM11ENDATION OF THE JURY.
It is now contended that the court abused its discretion
in sentencing the defendant to death rather than to life imprisonment as recommended by the jury.
It is settled in this state, and conceded by the defendant,
that an abuse of discretion must be shown before there can
be a reversal on the court's refusal to follow the recommendation of the jury. State v. Markham, 100 Utah 226, 112 P.
2d 496.

25
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The effect of recommendations of mercy vanes m the
various states. In some states the court is obligated to follow
the jury's recommendation. In others, a recommendation is
not authorized by law and is considered as merely advisory.
A few statutory provisions contemplate that the jury will base
its recommendation upon some evidence of mitigation or justification which appears at the trial. It is because of this variance that the statutory provisions should be studied when an
abuse of discretion on the part of the court is being asserted
on the grounds we have here.
Our provision is found in 103-28-4 Utah Code Annotated
1943, quoted in appellant's brief (p. 33). \Ve note that the
Utah statute has no conditions precedent to a recommendation
of mercy. A jury may recommend mercy even if the defendant
is convicted on overwhelming evidence and the crime is
heinous. A recommendation may be made, so to speak, on
the basis of the defendant's looks. And because such a recommendation need not be grounded in reason, there is nothing
on which we can conclude that the recommendation was made
because of "the skimpy case presented by the state." Such
a conclusion would be a guess. We must assume that the
jury considered the evidence, under the instructions, before
deciding whether defendant was guilty.
Utah has adopted the view that the discretion of the jury
m recommending life imprisonment is absolute and need
not be based upon evidence or a showing at the trial. State
v. Thorne, 39 Utah 208, 117 Pac. 58; State v. Romeo, 42
Utah 46, 128 Pac. 530.

26
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In State v. Markham, cited supra, 100 Utah 226, 112 P.
2d 496, there was some positive evidence presented by the
defense which might have tended to mitigate the seriousness
of the crime, yet the court refused to find an abuse of discretion
in the court's refusal to follow a recommendation of mercy.
In the present case there is nothing to indicate to the court
that the killing of Mr. Delk was anything but a cold-blooded
murder. There would not be an abuse of discretion here
even under the reasoning of the concurring opinion of Justice
Wolfe in the Markham case, which opinion sought to restrict,
to some extent at least, the exercise of discretion by the court
where it might appear that the recommendation of the jury
was based upon evidence-that is, something which would
tend to lessen the seriousness of the homicide. In the present
case there is no pretense, no contention, that there were any
mitigating circumstances. No provocation, sufficient or insufficient, was shown. There was no evidence of anything
bordering on justification or excuse. And our discussion of the
sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, under Point 1, has indicated that the depravity of the crime does not depend upon the type
of evidence used by the state to prove that crime. Defendant was
given an opportunity to appeal to the court's leniency, but
stood silent and offered to show nothing by any means or
persons. See, generally, on recommendations of mercy and
their effect, annotations in 12 A.L.R. 1153, and 87 A.L.R. 13 70.
CONCLUSION
The evidence in the case was sufficient to justify the
jury in determining that someone had cold-bloodedly, deliberately, premeditatedly, and with malice aforethought,
27

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

killed Levi P. Delk; that the murder was committed by the
defendant; and that the idea of theft of an automobile and
other property motivated the defendant to plan the murder.
All the evidence indicates that the murder was committed in
Salt Lake County. The instructions to the jury were fair and
fully protected the rights of the defendant. And, finally,
the court acted well within the bounds of its discretion in
sentencing the defendant to death. The authorities have convinced us that substantial justice was done in the court ·below,
and for that reason we believe that the judgment and sentence
should be affirmed. But if the court does find some error
which might have prejudiced the defendant, we respectfully
urge the court, if possible, to exercise its powers under 105-43-3
Utah Code Annotated 1943, and modify the judgment to
the extent that justice may be done.
Respectfully submitted,

CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General

BRYCE E. ROE,
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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